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HAPPY SPELLS? CONSTRUCTING AND 
DECONSTRUCTING A PRIVATE-LAW 
PERSPECTIVE ON SUBSIDIARITY 
PEER ZUMBANSEN* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
The increasingly frequent invocation of the idea and principle of subsidiarity 
as initially laid out in the famous 1931 papal encyclical,1 in public international 
law, and in various other legal fields is part of a larger enterprise that reflects 
the correlation between established domestic and international regulatory 
orders, on the one hand, and the shifts, brought about in a context of 
globalization, Europeanization, and privatization, on the other hand. The 
invocation of subsidiarity occurs at a moment when the stakes of political 
ordering and democratic organization on a global scale are particularly high. 
Given the fragmenting of public and private global governance regimes across a 
spectrum of highly specialized governance areas, questions of representation 
and participation, accountability, and legitimacy have become ever more 
pressing. Against this background, subsidiarity may have emerged as the 
unavoidable candidate for becoming the new “S”-word2 definitive of our 
engagements with challenges of an aspirational global order. It is against this 
background that we can appreciate the current interest in transnational law 
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1. See Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno n. 79 (May 15, 1931) (“It is a fundamental principle of 
social philosophy, fixed and unchangeable, that one should not withdraw from individuals and commit 
to the community what they can accomplish by their own enterprise and industry. So, too, it is an 
injustice and at the same time a grave evil and a disturbance to right order to transfer to the larger and 
higher collectivity functions which can be performed and provided for by lesser and subordinate bodies. 
Inasmuch as every social activity should, by its very nature, prove a help to members of the body social, 
it should never destroy or absorb them.”). 
 2.  See generally Louis Henkin, That ‘S’ Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, 
et cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999) (arguing that sovereignty becomes subsidiary when this 
foundational principle of international law clashes with the promotion and protection of human rights). 
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governance and regulation, and in both institutional and normative3 questions 
concerning the law’s ability to perform its regulatory functions in 
jurisdictionally unbounded spaces.4 
This article illustrates the relevance of international lawyers’ increased 
interest in subsidiarity against this background of legal–theoretical and 
political–normative engagement with the transnationalization of law.5 
Contextualizing current subsidiarity debates among international lawyers within 
a wider set of investigations that scholars have been undertaking with regard to 
the viability of the state-law nexus under conditions of globalization6 promises 
to make the study of subsidiarity more receptive to the shifting boundaries 
between different jurisdictions and regulatory areas. By reflecting on the 
architectures of variably conceived global legal orders, we regularly find deep-
running concerns as to whether it is possible to rely on lessons from domestic 
law in our aspirations for law “beyond,” rather than “without,” the state.7 
Although a number of recent efforts by public international lawyers in the 
United States8 and in Europe9 display considerable confidence regarding 
particular institutional and normative heritages, weighty evidence points to the 
blind spots of such projects regarding alternative, critical accounts of state 
building and governance in other regions.10 Such accounts strongly suggest the 
need for an expanded perspective on correlations between Western narratives 
of state development and histories of imperialism, colonization, decolonization, 
 
 3.  See generally T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Transnational Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy, 33 YALE 
J. INT’L L. 479 (2008) (exploring the relationship between transnational lawmaking and the legitimacy 
of transnational norms); Neil Walker, Taking Constitutionalism Beyond the State, 56 POL. STUD. 519 
(2008) (investigating the development of constitutionalism outside the confines of a state).  
 4.  E.g., Gralf-Peter Calliess et al., Transformations of Commercial Law: New Forms of Legal 
Certainty for Globalised Exchange Processes?, in TRANSFORMING THE GOLDEN AGE NATION STATE 
83 (Achim Hurrelman et al. eds., 2007); Gralf-Peter Calliess & Moritz Renner, Between Law and Social 
Norms: The Evolution of Global Governance, 22 RATIO JURIS 260 (2009). 
 5.  See generally Ralf Michaels, Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State, in LAW AND 
SOCIAL THEORY 287 (Reza Banakar & Max Travers eds., 2013) (providing an overview of the 
transformation of the state in the era of globalization and the incidental development of transnational 
law); Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Ordering and State Change, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 1 (Gregory Shaffer ed., 2013); Peer Zumbansen, Law and Legal 
Pluralism: Hybridity in Transnational Governance, in REGULATORY HYBRIDIZATION IN THE 
TRANSNATIONAL SPHERE 49 (Paulius Jurcys, Poul F. Kjaer & Ren Yatsunami eds., 2013). 
 6.  See MARIA ROSARIA FERRARES, PRIMA LEZIONE DI DIRITTO GLOBALE (2012) for an 
important analysis.   
 7.  See, e.g., Ralf Michaels, The Mirage of Non-State Governance, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 31, 35. 
 8.  See, e.g., Sabino Cassese, New Paths for Administrative Law: A Manifesto, 10 INT’L J. CONST. 
L. 603 (2012); Benedict Kingsbury et al., Global Governance as Administration—National and 
Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3 & 4, 
2005, at 1. 
 9.  See, e.g., Armin von Bogdandy, Philipp Dann & Matthias Goldmann, Developing the 
Publicness of Public International Law, 9 GERMAN L.J. 1375 (2008) (laying the foundation for the 
“International Public Authority” project at the Max Planck Institute in Heidelberg). 
 10.  See, e.g., ANOTHER KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE: BEYOND NORTHERN EPISTEMOLOGIES 
(Boaventura De Sousa Santos ed., 2007); B.S. Chimni, Co-option and Resistance: Two Faces of Global 
Administrative Law, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 799 (2005). 
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and more recent governance programs associated with the so-called 
Washington Consensus.11 Invoking a concept of subsidiarity can be done only in 
this context. 
Such reversal cannot be explained or justified on formal grounds alone. 
Proposing to revert existing hierarchies and competences of authority from the 
bottom to the top or demanding an alternative site of exercising supreme 
control engages the very foundation (indeed, the very legitimacy) of the 
regulatory apparatus. The invocation of subsidiarity cannot escape its 
entanglement in a deeper struggle regarding that which grounds, upholds, 
justifies, and legitimates the existing control architecture in the first place. 
Invoking subsidiarity touches on the integrity of that architecture, both 
normatively and institutionally. 
This article momentarily shifts attention away from normative hierarchy and 
subsidiarity in public international law and multilevel governance in order to 
contrast it with an analysis of subsidiarity thinking in what at first glance would 
suggest a perspective from the “other side” of public international law—
namely, from private law. But the law of subsidiarity, this bottom-up law whose 
regular instantiation is supposed to be private law, can only be traced back to 
only a very particular understanding of “private” law, namely the law associated 
with the self-regulation of the “market” or the “private” sphere. Such a turn to 
“private law” is motivated, above all, by the politics that appear to govern much 
of the debate over private-versus-public ordering, especially in the context of 
post–Welfare State deregulation and privatization discourses. As this article 
shows, the proliferation of transnational private regulatory regimes on the 
global scale must be understood as amplifying many of the advanced domestic 
governance structures’ institutional transformations. This suggests that even if 
we were ill advised to directly apply domestic law categories to often inchoate 
and multilayered transnational regulatory regimes, we still ought to investigate 
applying critical conceptual tools, experiences with rights formation, and 
learned insights into the legal pluralism of existing legal orders for a better 
understanding of “the transnational.” The case here, or rather, legal field in 
point, is labor law—an area of law that has forever been at the frontlines of 
conflict between a libertarian private law ideology (“you get what you contract 
for”)12 and a public and social law architecture committed to redistribution. 
 
 11.  See generally ANTONY ANGHIE, IMPERIALISM, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005) (arguing that the colonial confrontation was central to the formation of 
international law, that it has always been animated by the project of governing non-European peoples, 
and therefore that the economic exploitation and cultural subordination that resulted were 
constitutively significant for the discipline); SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL 
LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY (2011) (arguing 
that while the Global South has been inspired to use international law as an field to contest over 
inequality, this promise has been subsumed within a universal claim for a particular way of life by the 
idea of “development,” and international law has legitimized an ever-increasing sphere of intervention 
in the Third World). 
 12.  See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 58–59 (1905) (invalidating a New York statute 
forbidding bakers to work more than sixty hours per week or ten hours per day on the ground that it 
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Labor law’s woes started early on and have become dramatically amplified and 
accentuated in the current globalization context.13 Labor law poignantly 
illustrates the dark side of entrusting conflict resolution and redistributive 
mechanisms to private ordering. 
This correlation between the alleged pressure that globalization exercises 
upon the state and its legal order and the discovery that (domestic) law was 
never free, unified, and coherent, but rather has always been pluralist and 
unstable—is central to the here-proposed concept of transnational law. It thus is 
necessary to investigate the tendency to resort to private-law solutions in the 
context of state law failure (part II) before exploring the parallels and eventual 
continuities between domestic and transnational legal fragmentation and legal 
pluralism (part III) and the hidden politics of the “private legal realm” (part 
IV). A case study in part V illustrates the challenges of looking for legal 
answers in very much unchartered territory—namely, emerging elements of a 
transnational labor law regime—looking closer at the operation and 
implications of a “bottom-up” approach akin to ideas of subsidiarity in a 
particularly precarious regulatory area with high normative stakes. Part VI 
draws some conclusions and suggests directions for future research into the 
doctrine and politics of transnational regulatory regimes. 
II 
SUBSIDIARITY: THE PRIVATE LAW BIAS 
In light of the dramatic changes that mark the transformation, through the 
subsequent forms of the interventionist and the welfare state, of the twentieth-
century Rule of Law, both administrative and constitutional lawyers have 
become interested in exploring the relationship between domestic and 
transnational governance structures.14 Yet this relationship that should be 
described as a “transnational replay”15 occurs in numerous manners and 
 
interfered with freedom of contract and thus the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to liberty). 
 13.  See generally Harry W. Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The 
Benjamin Aaron Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271 (2001); Manfred Weiss, The Future of 
Comparative Labor Law as an Academic Discipline and as a Practical Tool, 25 COM. LAB. L. & POL’Y 
J. 169 (2003) (discussing the several challenges faced by comparative studies of labor law in the context 
of globalization such as the need for interdisciplinary cooperation and the increasing dependency on 
“soft” legal structure in the regulation of labor relations). 
 14.  See Alfred C. Aman Jr., The Limits of Globalization and the Future of Administrative Law: 
From Government to Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 379 (2001) (discussing the way in 
which administrative law may be reconceptualized to address the challenges, such as “democracy 
deficit,” caused by the delegation of public function to private actors as a result of globalization); 
Michel Rosenfeld, Rethinking Constitutional Ordering in an Era of Legal and Ideological Pluralism, 6 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 415 (2008) (proposing a pluralist constitutional ordering to allow for the 
coordination of the supranational, the national, and the infranational in ways that are neither 
hierarchical nor unidirectional). 
 15.  Peer C. Zumbansen, Law and Society and the Politics of Relevance: Facts and Fields 
Boundaries in ‘Transnational Legal Theory in Context’, 11 NO FOUNDATIONS: AN 
INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF LAW AND JUSTICE 1, 12 (2014), http://www.helsinki.fi/nofo 
/NoFo11_2014.pdf.  
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prompts critical engagement. Domestic state transformation offers valuable 
insights for a politically sensitive study of transnationalized regulatory regimes 
and global good governance dynamics. This is particularly true for a critique of 
the categories with which different spheres of political authority and legitimacy 
are distinguished along public-versus-private or state-versus-market lines. It is 
between those poles that a critique of emerging transnational regulatory 
regimes must offer insights into the connections as well as the continuities 
between struggles over power and democratic agency within and beyond a 
nation-state’s confines. 
For scholars of areas related to market governance, private law has tended 
to be their first-choice legal approach to address emerging hybrid regulatory 
regimes.16 The dominant interest in lex mercatoria as the quintessential 
instantiation of transnational law seems to be quite representative.17 The 
domestic preference for private law occurs against the background of a long, 
contested history of demarcating spheres of public and private, state and 
market as short-forms of normative universes. Private law has long been 
represented as the sphere where horizontal, contractual engagements occur 
between autonomous parties, free from governmental intervention. Preference 
for private over public law is apparent in the context of an established system of 
political references and routinized arguments.18 
Prioritizing public over private law rests on the assumption that a clear 
distinction exists between the two bodies of law. But although the demarcation 
of spheres of law is a staple of the Western nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
legal trajectory, it is also one of the most contested distinctions in legal–political 
thought. Calling one body of law “public” and another one “private” connotes 
universes of meaning, order, and value—the scope and impact of which must be 
critically unpacked in order to understand the respective discursive universes in 
which such references occur. 
That kind of scrutiny is hard work and is not frequently undertaken. What is 
therefore at stake in this impoverished space of making efficient choices 
between private-versus-public ordering is no longer the political nature of the 
legal order and its legitimacy. Instead, isolation of private-law solutions from 
the legal order within such solutions are sought limits perspective on ever-
 
 16.  See, e.g., Gralf-Peter Calliess, Reflexive Transnational Law: The Privatisation of Civil Law and 
the Civilisation of Private Law, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 185 (2002); Christian 
Joerges, The Science of Private Law and the Nation-State, in THE EUROPEANIZATION OF LAW: THE 
LEGAL EFFECTS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 47  (Francis Snyder ed., 2000). 
 17.  See the seminal volume of THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 
2001) (recording a conference in Münster in May, 2000, where the result of a scientific survey designed 
by a Research Team from the Center for Transnational Law of Münster University to clarify the 
process of transnationalization of commercial law in international contract negotiations, contract 
drafting, and international commercial arbitration). 
 18.  See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, The Public and the Private in the Provision of Law for Global 
Transactions, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND 
THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 239, 
239–40 (Volkmar Gessner et al. eds., 2009). 
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present, larger issues. Rather than a deeper reflection about correlations 
between “public” and “private” ordering regimes, the turn to private law is 
presented as the mere result of an allegedly simple choice between rationalities 
of different pragmatic value: government takes too long, becomes too big, and 
tends to overreach;19 private contracting is more cost- and time-efficient, 
discrete, and flexible. The current mainstream appears unimpressed at best, 
even if at the heart of the quintessential Lochner decision stood the labor law 
and legislative attempts to equalize or mitigate drastic employer–employee 
bargaining asymmetry. Calls for market-based rather than state-based 
governance solutions tend to obscure the difference in stakes between different 
fields of private law. These stakes, in turn, attract little attention in a climate 
where the market is offered as the only option in face of the state’s fading 
regulatory prerogative of global business affairs.20 This retreat of the state has 
become even more troublesome with the fast expansion of global markets. In 
globally integrated market exchanges, with law facilitating their consolidation 
and yet failing to generate viable, border-crossing regulation and enforcement 
regimes, everything becomes precarious. The emerging transnational 
ideological battle, compared to earlier standoffs in a functioning, 
constitutionally grounded system of balancing rights, seems to be exceptionally 
more problematic in a context without clearly identifiable constitutional texts, 
without a judiciary, and without the institutional representational safety net to 
rely on for a periodically reversible set of political preferences. This article’s 
discussion of private law does not point to engagement with contract, corporate, 
or labor law. Instead, in the context of international law’s interest in 
subsidiarity, it focuses on private law in order to illustrate the problems that 
arise from applying known legal categories to emerging transnational regulatory 
frameworks, using the case study of labor law to powerfully express the 
downsides of exposing some of the most vulnerable interests to the dynamics of 
market-based self-regulation. 
Where should the lawyer turn for reference points, foundations, and 
orientation? Even if a return to available toolkits seems to be the only possible 
strategy in light of the large-scale absence of effective public-law structures in 
transnational settings, the degree to which complex and fast-evolving 
transnational regulatory regimes can be adequately mapped along the 
delineations of public or private law remains unclear.  Whether one is 
concerned with standard-setting in different areas such as forestry21 or 
 
 19.  See, e.g., Republican Platform: Reforming the Government to Serve the People, REPUBLICAN 
NAT’L COMM., https://www.gop.com/platform/reforming-government (last visited Sept. 27, 2015) 
(detailing the U.S. Republican Party platform). 
 20. See, e.g., Veronique De Rugy, The Best Regulator? That’s Easy. It’s the Market, THE DAILY 
BEAST (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:45 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/10/16/the-best-regulator-
that-s-easy-it-s-the-market.html. 
 21.  E.g., Erroll Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private–Public Regulation: The Case 
of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47 (2006).  
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accounting,22 or with standards pertaining to labor and environmental 
conditions within global supply chains,23 the central challenge is determining 
how to understand and conceptualize such regimes against the background of a 
critical engagement with the public–private distinction, as it has been proposed 
in the context of domestic state transformation.24 While the proliferation of 
transnational regulatory regimes responds to and is driven by far-reaching 
transformations in states and markets, a critical scrutiny of the foundations of 
these developments’ legitimacy is seriously lagging behind. 
Conceptual and terminological proposals abound: notions such as “private 
authority,”25 “transnational private regulatory governance,”26 and “transnational 
law” itself27 evince a fast-evolving laboratory of empirical, doctrinal, and 
conceptual analyses. But rather than attempting to “bring the state back in,” 
like a global lion tamer, research on diverse industries points to the need to 
develop responsive, evolutionary, and adaptive regulatory strategies, taking into 
account the multilayered nature of processes and practices under investigation.28 
References to “private” as opposed to “public” forms of regulation should not 
be read as indicating a clear choice between neatly separable regulatory 
responses. Instead, the turn to private transnational governance suggests a 
complementing and, in some cases, a far-reaching decentering of a formerly 
state-based regulatory response regime, resulting in the combination of hard 
and soft, formal and informal regulatory elements. But consequently, the 
current transnationalization of regulatory regimes in a global, functionally 
differentiated society is only partially receptive to the same normative critique 
that the waning welfare states in Western democracies prompted in the 1980s.29 
 
 22.  E.g., Dieter Kerwer, Rules That Many Use: Standards and Global Regulation, 18 
GOVERNANCE 611 (2005); Walter Mattli & Tim Büthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a 
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., nos. 3 & 4, 2005, at 
225. 
 23.  E.g., RICHARD M. LOCKE, THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF PRIVATE POWER: PROMOTING 
LABOR STANDARDS IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (2013). 
 24.  E.g., Günter Frankenberg, Shifting Boundaries: The Private, the Public, and the Welfare State, 
in THE MIXED ECONOMY OF SOCIAL WELFARE 72 (Michael B. Katz & Christoph Sachße eds., 1996); 
Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1611 (2001) (discussing the engagement of private third parties in the delivery of 
public goods by government as new tools used to cope with public problems). 
 25.  See generally PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (A. Claire Cutler, 
Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999) (exploring private firms’ attempt to establish rules and 
standards in global commerce, in the absence of governmental action, through case studies in both 
contemporary and historical perspective).  
 26.  See generally Symposium, Transnational Private Regulatory Governance: Regimes, Dialogue, 
Constitutionalization, 13 GERMAN L.J. 1269 (2012).  
 27.  See generally PHILIP C. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW (1956). For a critical appraisal see 
Christian Tietje, Alan Brouder & Karsten Nowrot eds., Philip C. Jessup’s Transnational Law 
Revisited—On the Occasion of the 50th Anniversary of Its Publication, BEITRÄGE ZUM 
TRANSNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFTRECHT [ESSAYS IN TRANSNAT'L L.], no. 50, Feb. 2006, 
http://www.wirtschaftsrecht.uni-halle.de/sites/default/files/altbestand/Heft50.pdf.   
 28.  See generally Symposium, Equator Principles, 5 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 331 (2014).  
 29.  See, e.g., Jürgen Habermas, The New Obscurity: The Crisis of the Welfare State and the 
Exhaustion of Utopian Energies, in THE NEW CONSERVATISM: CULTURAL CRITICISM AND THE 
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Instead, today’s critique is in need of a comprehensive grounding of its premises 
and starting points in a postnational, postdemocratic context. Without the 
regulatory state and redistributive politics as bargaining tokens, one must 
develop a more contextual critique within transnational regulatory regimes such 
as labor and human rights law, where the traditional, nation-state reference 
points of state versus market or public versus private are of only limited value.30 
Subsidiarity has recently been receiving considerable attention within public 
international law. The foregoing could be seen as pointing to the domestic as 
well as transnational private law undercurrents. One can observe at the same 
time that international lawyers take the cues of seminal political economy work 
and start looking for “small-scale,” “bottom-up,” and decentralization 
solutions.31 These possible long-term reorientations invite a closer look, 
especially as to how this new interest in subsidiarity relates to the just-
mentioned positions, which were long ago developed in the context of debates 
around the limits of state action32 and the appropriate level of public authority.33 
This article unearths the political dimensions of this recent interest in 
subsidiarity among international lawyers before turning to transnational law as 
the site of engagement with both institutional and normative consequences of 
the alluded-to transformation of state-based governance structures and the 
proliferation of private and hybrid regulatory regimes. 
III 
WHY SUBSIDIARITY? DREAMING OF BOTTOM-UP SOVEREIGNTY 
IN FRAGMENTED LEGAL ORDERS 
International law’s interest in subsidiarity appears to develop at a time when 
the status of the discipline is increasingly uncertain. Against the backdrop of 
one of its worst identity crises during the Kosovo conflict—a crisis that 
deepened dramatically after 9/11 and the War in Iraq—international law has 
become one of the most hotly debated legal fields. 
 
HISTORIANS’ DEBATE 48 (Jürgen Habermas ed., Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., 1989). This essay by 
Habermas is one of the most often, and by now canonically, used references for this point. 
 30.  See H. W. Arthurs, Reinventing Labor Law for the Global Economy: The Benjamin Aaron 
Lecture, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 271, 284 (2001); Kevin Kolben, Transnational Labor 
Regulation and the Limits of Governance, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN LAW 403, 404 (2011).  
 31.  See, e.g., Andreas Follesdal, Subsidiarity, 6 J. POL. PHIL. 190 (1998); Friedrich Hayek, The Use 
of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945) (arguing against the establishment of a Central 
Pricing Board by highlighting the dynamic and organic nature of market price fluctuation that 
consolidates and communicates a multitude of market information effectively); Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (proposing a model where citizens 
choose municipalities in accordance with their preference for the provision of public goods and local 
taxation, which in turn sorts population into optimum communities).  
 32.  See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (1944) (warning of the danger 
of tyranny that inevitably results from government control of economic decisionmaking through central 
planning).  
 33.  See generally Tiebout, supra note 31.  
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The field’s short history34 has nevertheless been a very lively one, albeit with 
the threat of apology triumphing over utopia35 never convincingly disarmed. 
The very instability of international law is amplified by its origins in both 
ideological and methodological contestation. This background illustrates the 
degree to which international law’s interest in subsidiarity builds on the longer-
standing investigations into its structure and architecture, focusing (especially in 
recent years) on questions of unity, coherence, and fragmentation. The current 
interest in subsidiarity echoes international lawyers’ debates regarding the 
notion of fragmentation. Those debates became prominent about a decade ago, 
as the proliferation of transnational regulatory regimes and an increasingly 
functionally differentiated transnational judiciary prompted international 
lawyers to search for grounding assumptions about the role of states, 
international organizations, and their interaction.36 Of great significance has 
been the engagement among international lawyers with the phenomenon of 
fragmentation,37 relating to both diversification and pluralization “of substantive 
norms, [that is], the complex interactions caused by the existence of a staggering 
variety of substantive sources of international law, made up of tens of thousands 
of international treaties in addition to customary rules,”38 on the one hand, and 
the “fragmentation of international authority . . .”39 concerned “not with the 
interrelationship between rules, as such, but rather with the distribution of 
power (in the legal sense of the word) among the plethora of international and 
national institutions and organisations who produce, interpret and apply 
international law,”40 on the other. Additionally, a critical introspection of 
 
 34.  See MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, THE GENTLE CIVILIZER OF NATIONS: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1870–1960 (2002) (recounting the emergence of a liberal sensibility in 
international law in the late nineteenth century to its subsequent decline after the Second World War).  
 35.  See generally MARTTI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT (1989) (demonstrating how international law becomes 
dangerous to the contrasting criticisms of being either an irrelevant moralist Utopia or a manipulable 
facade for state interests). 
 36.  See generally STEVEN WHEATLEY, THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW (2010). 
 37.  E.g., Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/61/10  
400–23 (2006) (documenting the fragmentation of sources and institutions in public international law); 
see generally Martti Koskenniemi & Paivi Leino, Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern 
Anxieties, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 553 (2002) (arguing that the proliferation of international tribunals and 
their use to further new interests does not warrant excessive worries over fragmentation of 
international law, and should be viewed instead as an institutional expression of political pluralism 
internationally). 
 38.  Tomer Broude, Fragmentation(s) of International Law: On Normative Integration as Authority 
Allocation, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: CONSIDERING 
SOVEREIGNTY, SUPREMACY AND SUBSIDIARITY 99, 101–102 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 
2008). 
 39.  Id. at 104.  
 40.  Id. at 102; see generally PHILIPPA WEBB, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INTEGRATION AND 
FRAGMENTATION (2013) (addressing whether the growing number of international judicial bodies 
render decisions that are largely consistent with one another, which factors influence this 
(in)consistency, and what this tells us about the development of international law by international 
courts and tribunals). 
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sovereignty, both from within41 and outside42 the Western–liberal edifice of 
international law drives a lively debate over the proprieties and foundations of 
the field. Without probing the international law’s internal debate over the 
merits and perhaps future of a comprehensive concept of subsidiarity much 
further, this context of a transnationalization of regulatory regimes will not only 
continue to play a great role in ongoing attempts at understanding the emerging 
international legal landscape, it will lead to ever sharper accentuation of the 
ideological–political stakes in the normative discussion about the role and value 
of international law. 
Turning from international law to transnational law provides a more 
sensitive discursive framework for the institutional and normative implications 
of a turn to subsidiarity and bottom-up governance. Here, this article reengages 
with the theme of fragmentation by placing particular emphasis on its nature. 
Analysis of fragmentation through the lens of transnational law, here 
understood as a method rather than a distinct legal field, shows that 
descriptions of allegedly “real” constellations such as the “unity of (domestic or 
international) law”43 are in fact normative assessments, more prescriptive than 
descriptive. Critical deconstruction can show the stakes involved in making 
arguments for or against fragmentation, and for or against an allegedly 
interventionist state. 
Studying fragmentation through the lens of transnational law facilitates 
unpacking the normative implications of arguments regarding merits or risks of 
bottom-up governance, subsidiarity, and diffused public authority. In contrast 
to international law, transnational law is even less certain about the 
constituents, boundaries, and foundations of itself as a field. Its regulatory 
purpose, doctrinal basis, judicial forum, and normative hierarchy are even less 
clearly defined than the correlatives in international law. Transnational law, 
with its roots in international law, conflict of laws, comparative law, and 
sociological jurisprudence, seems to have an even more precarious stand than 
international law in dealing with fragmentation and globalization. But this 
allows transnational lawyers perhaps to exercise certain discretion in 
conceptualizing and connecting different research agendas and in developing an 
innovative ethnographic investigative strategy. A normative–institutional focus 
 
 41.  See, e.g.,  Henkin, supra note 2 (arguing that the sovereignty of states in international law is 
essentially a mistake).  
 42.  See, e.g., Lillian Aponte Miranda, The Role of International Law in Intrastate Natural Resource 
Allocation: Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Peoples-Based Development, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
785 (2012) (arguing that while international law may have been originally concerned with the allocation 
of land and natural resources in only an interstate context, it plays a distributive role today in an 
intrastate context); Rebecca Tsosie, Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: Comparative Models of 
Sovereignty, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 239 (2013) (highlighting the need to merge the international and 
domestic frameworks of sovereignty to meet the challenges of climate change for indigenous peoples). 
 43.  The theme of “unity of the legal order” has been the focus of a number of studies by German 
authors. See, e.g., MANFRED BALDUS, DIE EINHEIT DER RECHTSORDNUNG (1995); DAGMAR FELIX, 
EINHEIT DER RECHTSORDNUNG. ZUR VERFASSUNGSRECHTLICHEN RELEVANZ EINER 
ARGUMENTATIONSFIGUR (1998). 
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on the “actors, norms, and processes”44 in transnational governance must be 
brought together with both socio-legal and political analysis45 of the law–non-
law distinction in “the distinction between law and fact,”46 with the testing case 
for transnational law being its ability to develop a framework of Actors-Norms-
Processes (A-N-P) into a concept combining both public and private law 
perspectives on a legal sociological basis. 
At the center of an approach such as A-N-P is an understanding of law that 
does not take a particular historical, institutional, or normative framework for 
granted when delineating the boundaries and substance of an area of law. 
Rather, the approach of “transnational legal pluralism”47 proposes to preempt 
the identification of regulatory structures, rights creation, and legitimacy 
guarantees from an objective or even universal standpoint regarding an 
underlying but asserted and immunized theory of law. The aim is to use A-N-P 
to invite different and competing, perhaps incompatible, concepts of norm-
creation, political representation, and participation to render visible differences 
in understanding law’s role in various societal settings. A-N-P is at the basis of 
this article’s political critique of the use of normative hierarchy or multilevel 
governance arguments with regard to subsidiarity both from a public 
(international) and private law perspective. 
The debate over transnational law as a field or method cannot escape 
engagement with legitimacy. It inevitably becomes an investigation into the 
political dimensions of the legal pluralist order. This becomes obvious in areas 
of transnational regulatory conflicts that illustrate the porosity of the protective 
fabric that law is asked to cast over the interests of the most vulnerable,48 such 
as labor law, investment arbitration,49 food safety,50 or environmental law.51 At 
 
 44.  See Peer Zumbansen, Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global 
Governance and Legal Pluralism, 21 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 305, 308 (2012). 
 45.  See, e.g., Roger Cotterrell, What is Transnational Law?, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 500 (2012) 
(considering what approaches may be most productive, and what key issues need to be addressed, to 
make sense of broad trends in law’s extension beyond the boundaries of nation-states); Prabha 
Kotiswaran, Do Feminists Need an Economic Sociology of Law?, 40 J. L. & SOC’Y 115 (2013) (offering 
an economic sociology of law pursued in legal ethnographic terms as a way of revitalizing contemporary 
feminist legal thought on the market and the economy, illustrating its use in the context of international 
anti-trafficking law and transnational surrogacy).  
 46.  See, e.g., BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 470 (2002); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global 
Interplay of Legal and Social Systems, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 149 (1997). 
 47.  See generally Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 1 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL 
THEORY 141 (2010). 
 48.  See Susan Marks, Law and the Production of Superfluity, 2 TRANSNAT’L LEGAL THEORY 1, 4 
(2011). 
 49.  See GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2006); 
Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah, Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 10 
SINGAPORE Y.B. OF INT’L L. 19 (2006). 
 50.  See Alexia Herwig, Transnational Governance Regimes for Foods Derived from Bio-
Technology and Their Legitimacy, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 199 
(Gunther Teubner, Christian Joerges & Inger-Johanne Sand eds., 2004). 
 51.  See Usha Natarajan, TWAIL and the Environment: The State of Nature, the Nature of the State, 
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the heart of these areas are conflicts concerning agency, exclusion and inclusion, 
and power, even if debated and negotiated in apparently “technical” terms.52 
Such conflicts concern the political architecture of the system itself. They direct 
our attention to the construction of allocations of authority. It is from that 
perspective that this article returns to the status of private law. 
IV 
THE POLITICS OF THE PRIVATE 
Although this article focuses on the political construction of the overall 
system, private law offers an interesting perspective. Behind the calls for 
marketization and private law–based regulatory approaches there is no 
aspiration for what public lawyers would frame as a coherent, all-encompassing 
legal system of authority. Instead, the preference for private law seems to be 
based on the idea that the market (rather than the state) can improve individual 
welfare, for example, by promoting regulatory competition53 or 
decentralization.54 The displacement of a public law perspective by a private law 
perspective, however, results in the invocations of a more coherent system of 
ordered hierarchy with a particularly carved-out place for subsidiarity to be 
pursued in pure self-interest. The private law bias, in turn, tends to disregard 
the “bigger picture,” which would allow us to acknowledge the distributive 
effects of the overall system on vulnerable parties. In Hayek’s construction of 
regulatory competition, which has become formative for market governance law 
under new institutional economics, the legal system is a backup plan, an 
emergency construct to be called upon only in a situation of market failure.55 
The irony that markets are not “natural” creatures but are constituted by law 
and governed by property rights and by indirect and direct redistributive 
politics56 mostly seems lost on authors espousing Hayek’s view. Instead, one is 
presented with a juxtaposition of law as a nonfoundational realm of “formal  
 
 
and the Arab Spring, 14 OR. REV. INT’L L. 177 (2012); see also INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW AND THE GLOBAL SOUTH (Shawkat Alam et al. eds., 2015) (surveying both the historical origins 
of the North–South divide in European colonialism as well as its contemporary manifestations on a 
range of issues such as food justice, energy justice, indigenous rights, trade, and emphasizing the Global 
South’s  priorities and perspectives in the face of environmental problems).  
 52.  See Richard Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 898 
(1999) (“Both individual rights and the formal rules of jurisdiction are ‘technologies of the self’; they 
are discourses and concrete acts that define political selfhood and provide the model for biological 
individuals to ‘perform themselves’ as (autonomous, rational, profit-maximizing, god fearing, desiring, 
willful, raced, sexed) selves.”). 
 53.  See generally Hayek, supra note 31; Roberta Romano, Law as Product: Some Pieces of the 
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).  
 54.  See generally Tiebout, supra note 31. 
 55.  See Hayek’s famous depiction of the role of the state in a system of rule of law, HAYEK, supra 
note 32, at 112–13 (“Within the known rules of the game the individual is free to pursue his personal 
ends and desires, certain that the powers of government will not be used deliberately to frustrate his 
efforts.”). 
 56.  DUNCAN KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT 6–8 (2006). 
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norms” and “social norms” that allegedly govern all relations in society—unless 
hampered by the interventionist state politics via legislation or judicial act.57 
For international and private lawyers alike, invocations of subsidiarity 
regularly imply coexistence of different normative systems, even if they are only 
concerned with reversal of a formal normative, institutional hierarchy. And 
although a public lawyer may emphasize how the overall system might attain 
integrity and stability, the private lawyer appears much less interested in overall 
effect. References to subsidiarity and private government can often prove to 
have a destabilizing and disintegrating effect, seen from a public law 
perspective. From the perspective of libertarian-oriented private law, the 
disintegration and weakening of central government is not seen as a threat, but 
rather as the natural side effect of lower-level empowerment and protection of 
individual rights.58 This is exactly the paradox in a public-and-private-law 
reading of dynamics such as regulatory competition, illustrated, for example, by 
concerns about competing or conflicting investment arbitration awards.59 A 
parallel reading of subsidiarity invocations in both international and private law 
says much about how subsidiarity is supposed to subject the entire control 
architecture to critique, but from diametrically opposed viewpoints. The 
demarcation of boundaries60 and levels of regulatory competence61 is 
fundamentally an investigation into the normative foundation of the order. This 
investigation will proceed differently depending on whether we start from a 
public or a private law perspective. Whereas, from a public law perspective, it is 
all about coherence, integrity, and effectiveness, private lawyers can 
problematically foster the opposite,62 as long as one accepts the law–social 
norms distinction put forward so persuasively by New Institutional Economics, 
 
 57.  See, e.g., David Charny, Illusions of a Spontaneous Order: ‘Norms’ in Contractual 
Relationships, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1841 (1996) (discussing the supplementary role of non-legal norms in 
commercial transactions); Peer Zumbansen, Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and 
the Ironic Turn of Reflexive Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 769 (2008) (analyzing the contemporary 
emergence of neoformalist and neofunctionalist approaches to lawmaking at a time when the state is 
seeking to reassert, reformulate, and reconceptualize its regulatory competence, both domestically and 
transnationally through a comparison of the American and German experiences with the rise of social 
interventionist state). 
 58.  See generally FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY, VOLUME 1: RULES 
AND ORDER (1973). 
 59.  See, e.g., VAN HARTEN, supra note 49, at 1–11; Broude, supra note 38, at 105–06. 
 60.  See Lawrence M. Friedman, Borders: On the Emerging Sociology of Transnational Law, 32 
STAN. L. REV. 65, 65 (1996) (“[Social sciences] face obstacles whenever and wherever it tries to cross 
borders and compare institutions in different societies.”); Ford, supra note 52. 
 61.  See generally Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Geology of International Law—Governance, 
Democracy and Legitimacy, 64 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND 
VÖLKERRECHT [ZaöRV] 547 (2004); Mattias Kumm, The Legitimacy of International Law: A 
Constitutionalist Framework of Analysis, 15 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2004). 
 62.  See, e.g., Markus Jachtenfuchs, The Governance Approach to European Integration, 39 J. 
COMMON MARKET STUD. 245 (2001); Christian Joerges, Economic Law, the Nation-State and the 
Maastricht Treaty, in EUROPE AFTER MAASTRICHT: AN EVER CLOSER UNION? 29 (Renaud Dehousse 
ed., 1994). 
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law and economics, as well as the so-called social norms scholars.63 Remarkably, 
the turn to social norms occurs in the most straightforward manner and 
seemingly without any awareness of long-standing legal–sociological and legal–
anthropological insights into the facts and politics of the interplay between 
formal and informal rules.64 
The central contention here is that references to bottom-up governance or 
subsidiarity constitute a replay of law and non-law distinctions central to the 
disputes between welfarist (or altruistic) and individualist (or egoistic)65 
positions regarding the regulation of market behavior. The argument is not 
new. Legal realists and their attentive disciples sought to uncover the reifying 
impact of allocating particular instrumental purpose to one field of law in 
distinction from the other.66 Rendering agency and choice invisible in this 
allocation, the demarcations between public and private and between state and 
market work so that the latter becomes represented as natural. What happens, 
however, is that the representation of the market—not impinged by the state’s 
overreaching intervention and redistributive politics—will now be seen as real 
instead of as a rhetorical outcome based on a particular premise, or as the 
prescriptive and predictable outcome of a dominating mindset. 
This objectification is more easily discernable from a private, rather than 
public international, law perspective. Whereas for international lawyers, who 
constantly compare “the international” with “the domestic,” subsidiarity turns a 
logically hierarchized legal order on its head,67 private lawyers, who display a 
more relaxed attitude towards such distinctions, welcome both domestic and 
international spheres as yet-to-be-explored regions of autonomous interaction.68 
Private lawyers have always been able to imagine private law without (too much 
of) the state. Early and mid-twentieth-century acclamations of laissez-faire 
 
 63.  See, e.g., Gillian Hadfield, The Public and the Private in the Provision of Law for Global 
Services, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: EMPIRICAL STUDIES AND 
THEORETICAL DEBATES ON INSTITUTIONAL SUPPORT FOR GLOBAL ECONOMIC EXCHANGES 239 
(Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009). 
 64.  For a critique of this wholesale embrace of market solutions, see, for example, Kotiswaran, 
supra note 45; see also Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Field as an 
Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973); Stewart Macaulay, Elegant Models, 
Empirical Pictures, and the Complexities of Contract, 11 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 507 (1977). 
 65.  See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 1685 (1976) (arguing that the form and substance of contract law are related, and that the 
“opposed rhetorical modes” of both levels “reflect a deeper level of contradiction” in the liberal world 
vision, in particular, the contradictory substantive commitment to individualism and altruism). 
 66.  E.g., Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L. REV. 8 (1927); Kennedy, 
supra note 65. 
 67.  See generally ERIC A. POSNER, THE PERILS OF GLOBAL LEGALISM (2009). 
 68.  For an enthusiastic embrace of an autonomous, transnational private law, see Klaus Peter 
Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market Place: A 21st Century View of Transnational 
Commercial Law, in THE PRACTICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1 (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001). See 
skeptical comments by Peer Zumbansen, Piercing the Legal Veil: Commercial Arbitration and 
Transnational Law, 8 EUR. L.J. 400 (2002), as well as in Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Private 
Regulatory Governance: Ambiguities of Public Authority and Private Power, 76 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 2, 2013, at 117, 123. 
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liberalism, limiting governments’ interventionist prerogatives69 in core areas like 
contract or corporate law, were premised on outright rejection of law to 
prioritize a pre-political order of self-governing society over redistributive 
politics.70 The long-standing analysis of law’s interpenetration with 
socioeconomic and political order71 had no lasting impact on an ideology, which 
separated a nonpolitical market sphere from an overzealous and ultimately 
incompetent72 state. During the transformation and deconstruction of the 
Western welfare state during the 1980s and 1990s, private lawyers were caught 
up in debates over subsidiarity that eloquently revived ideological stances of the 
formalist–functionalist divides of the 1920s and the state-versus-market disputes 
of the 1970s.73 Invocations of subsidiarity and calls for a “private law society”74 
as governing principles for emerging market orders under threats of 
globalization must be seen as charged with a particular vision of how societies 
should be ordered—and governed. Invocations of subsidiarity, self-government, 
and bottom-up empowerment have been celebrating a transnational comeback 
in the context of “good governance” programs.75 Given the ideological stakes of 
the current interest in subsidiarity as a governing principle, there is a growing 
need for a political critique of how this development affects vulnerable 
positions. 
 
 69.  E.g., Paul Kens, Lochner v. New York: Tradition or Change in Constitutional Law?, 1 N.Y.U. 
J. L. & LIBERTY 404 (2003). For a sharp analysis of Lochner, see Kennedy, supra note 56, at 8–16. 
 70.  See generally ADOLF A. BERLE, THE 20TH CENTURY CAPITALIST REVOLUTION (1954) 
(offering particularly valuable insights in Chapter V “Corporate Capitalism and the City of God”); John 
Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926).  
 71.  E.g., MAX WEBER, ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max Rheinstein ed., Edward Shils 
& Max Rheinstein trans., 1967) (exploring features of Western law that were favorable to the 
development of the capitalistic economy and in what ways this economy has reacted upon methods of 
legal thoughts, and also whether logical rationality, peculiar to certain parts of the Western world, is 
connected with that rational method of economic thought characteristic of Western capitalism); FRANZ 
WIEACKER, PRIVATRECHTSGESCHICHTE DER NEUZEIT UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG 
DER DEUTSCHEN ENTWICKLUNG (1967) (tracing the development of private law rules from a formal, 
rule-based body of law to an increasingly material, standards-based one). 
 72.  See generally ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) (putting forward a 
comprehensive critique of the judiciary’s incompetence in adequately regulating complex business 
disputes); POSNER, supra note 67. 
 73.  For the debate in the 1920s, see for example Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a 
Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). An excellent overview and analysis of the 
arguments against the welfare state since the 1970s is provided by Paul Pierson, The New Politics of the 
Welfare State, 48 WORLD POL. 143 (1996). 
 74.  See generally FRANZ BYDLINSKI, DAS PRIVATRECHT IM RECHTSSYSTEM EINER 
“PRIVATRECHTSGESELLSCHAFT” (1994). The origins therefore lie in the legal–political concept of 
Ordoliberalism. See, e.g., Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Eucken & Hans Großmann-Doerth, The Ordo 
Manifesto of 1936, in GERMANY’S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION 15 (Alan 
Peacock & Hans Willgerodt eds., 1989). 
 75.  For a critique, see Sally Engle Merry, Measuring the World: Indicators, Human Rights, and 
Global Governance, in LAW IN TRANSITION: RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
141 (Peer Zumbansen & Ruth Buchanan eds., 2014); Kerry Rittich, Functionalism and Formalism: 
Their Latest Incarnations in Contemporary Development and Governance Debates, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 
853 (2005).  
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V 
TRANSNATIONAL LABOR LAW FOR GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS? 
Using the example of the Rana Plaza building collapse in Dhaka, 
Bangladesh in 2013 and the ensuing creation of soft-law provisions pertaining to 
the fire- and building-safety conditions (the “Accord” and the “Worker Safety 
Alliance”),76 scholars, union activists, human rights advocacy experts, and labor 
and corporate lawyers were engaged in developing (or preventing) binding legal 
responses in a situation where the facts were still mostly evolving and there was 
not yet a court decision. Whereas the above discussion illustrated the different 
premises in a discussion of subsidiarity among public and private lawyers, the 
following provides an example of how a turn to subsidiarity unfolds in a setting 
with high stakes for vulnerable parties. 
The 2013 collapse of Rana Plaza, the eight-story building that housed 
numerous sweat shops producing garments for international retailers such as 
Benetton and Primark, killed over 1,100 people.77 This was quickly noted to be 
not an isolated incident but instead one in a long series of workplace disasters 
that have claimed the lives of garment factory workers.78 Maybe the proximity 
between this event and the “shirt on [y]our back”79 helped drive a public 
awareness campaign during which numerous labor and human rights activist 
groups, including some of the before very marginalized Bangladeshi unions, 
found themselves in a position of influence. This coalition building, however, 
was complicated by numerous parallel and concurring negotiations between the 
Bangladeshi government, foreign and Bangladeshi industry representatives, the 
International Labor Organization, and Western governments, raising the stakes 
for all parties to reach a compromise in a timely fashion. 
The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh,80 with its relatively 
ambitious monitoring mechanism, was agreed to with wide buy-in from the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), international and Bangladeshi 
industry, Bangladeshi unions and Western partners (mostly in the European 
 
 76.  See generally Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, BANGLADESHACCORD.ORG 
(May 13, 2013), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf; ALLIANCE 
FOR BANGLADESH WORKER SAFETY, http://www.bangladeshworkersafety.org (last visited Sept. 29, 
2015). For an analysis, background, and summary of the Bangladesh Accord, see Tom Hayes, Robbie 
Gilbert & Nick Thomas, The Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh: An Analysis, 
BRUSSELS EUROPEAN EMPLOYEES RELATIONS GROUP & MORGAN LEWIS (2013), 
http://www.european-law-school.eu/media/ReaderZumbansenfinal.pdf. 
 77.  Joseph Allchin & Amy Kazmin, Bangladesh Mourns as Factory Toll Reaches 228, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/27e66642-ad71-11e2-a2c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3RS 
WemSYT.  
 78.  Joseph Allchin & Amy Kazmin, Scores Dead in Bangladeshi Garment Factory Collapse, FIN. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/bf534db4-acbe-11e2-b27f-00144feabdc0.html? 
siteedition=intl#axzz3RSWemSYT.  
 79.  See Lindsay Poulton et al., The Shirt On Your Back: The Human Cost of the Bangladeshi 
Garment Industry, THE GUARDIAN, http://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2014/apr/bang 
ladesh-shirt-on-your-back.  
 80.  Accord on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh, BANGLADESHACCORD.ORG (May 13, 
2013), http://bangladeshaccord.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/the_accord.pdf. 
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Union and partly the United States). This mechanism was not the first attempt 
to develop an effective labor law for a four-million-workers industry that 
constitutes seventy-five percent of Bangladesh’s gross domestic product. The 
Accord complements, rather than substitutes, existing (although not effectively 
enforced) regulatory regimes at the national level in Bangladesh. For example, 
under the Sustainability Compact for Bangladesh, Bangladesh committed to 
amend its labor law and work with the ILO to develop additional legislative 
proposals.81 But that Accord is built exclusively around a soft-law approach, and 
it thus raises significant doubts regarding its potential to constitute a viable 
building block of a much-needed, transnational legal regime addressing global 
supply chains. It also raises serious concerns about the Accord’s ability to have 
an impact on the prevailing political economy, in which, in Bangladesh’s case, 
the immense garment industry of pivotal national importance is deeply 
embedded.82 
Meanwhile, the ILO played an important role by presiding over the Accord, 
a now well-known and widely publicized voluntary compensation program. The 
ILO serves as the “neutral chair” of the Rana Plaza Coordination Committee, 
which both developed and now oversees the Rana Plaza Arrangement, which 
constitutes the process to support victims and their families. Significant sectors 
of the Bangladeshi industry and global brands subscribe to the Arrangement 
and are represented on the Committee.83 But in December 2014, the Committee 
reduced its overall compensation estimate by a quarter, to $30 million.84 
Of particular relevance in this constellation is the role played by unions, 
both locally and transnationally. A number of garment-industry unions 
prepared, drafted, and signed the Accord on Fire and Building Safety in 
Bangladesh.85 However, this is against a background of widely reported ongoing 
intimidation of unions in Bangladesh.86 For example, after leaders of the 
 
 81.  Joint Statement, Government of Bangladesh & The European Union, Staying Engaged: A 
Sustainability Compact for Continuous Improvements in Labour Rights and Factory Safety in the 
Ready-Made Garment and Knitwear Industry in Bangladesh (July 8, 2013), http://trade.ec. 
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/tradoc_151601.pdf. 
 82.  See, e.g., U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman Comments on President’s Decision to 
Suspend GSP Benefits for Bangladesh, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/press-releases/2013/june/michael-froman-gsp-
bangladesh (last visited Sept. 30, 2015); AFT Supports Withdrawal of Bangladesh Trade Privileges, AM. 
FED’N OF TEACHERS, http://www.aft.org/news/aft-supports-withdrawal-bangladesh-trade-privileges 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2015).  
 83.  See RANA PLAZA ARRANGEMENT, http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/ (last visited Sept. 
30, 2015). The Arrangement has been signed by leading buyers such as Primark, the Bangladesh 
Ministry of Labour, Bangladesh Employers’ Federation as well as major labor unions such as 
Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association. See Full Text, RANA PLAZA 
ARRANGEMENT, http://www.ranaplaza-arrangement.org/mou/full-text (last visited Nov. 1, 2015). 
 84.  Monira Munni, Compensation Estimate Cut by $10m, THE FIN. EXPRESS (Dec. 22, 2014), 
http://www.thefinancialexpress-bd.com/2014/12/22/72120.  
 85.  See Official Signatories, ACCORD ON FIRE AND BUILDING SAFETY IN BANGLADESH, 
http://bangladeshaccord.org/signatories/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
 86.  See, e.g., Ruma Paul, Bangladesh Garment Factories Intimidate Workers Over Unions: Group, 
REUTERS (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/06/us-bangladesh-labour-rights-
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National Garment Workers Federation wrote to U.S. contacts about their 
concerns, Mohammed Atiqul Islam, President of the Bangladesh Garment 
Manufacturing and Exporters Association, stated that “those who are making 
allegations abroad without informing anyone must face sedition charges.”87 
Considering the immense scope of the country’s garment industry,88 the 
Bangladeshi government’s role in actively supporting workers’ collective rights 
is noteworthy. After the tragedy at Rana Plaza, the ILO and others pointed to 
the missed opportunity of preventing workers from returning to the reportedly 
unsafe building, if there had been a stronger role for unions.89 Although 
Bangladeshi workers have the right to form unions “[o]n paper,” in practice 
“attempts to unionise the country’s garment workers have been ruthlessly 
suppressed.”90 The poignancy of this finding is further enhanced by the fact that 
“at least 10 per cent of Bangladesh’s parliament members are direct owners of 
the country’s garment factories.”91 
Considering the worldwide integration of the garment industry’s supply 
chain,92 the role of foreign governments could be a crucial factor. U.S. Trade 
Representative Michael Froman recently stated, 
We urge the [Bangladeshi–PZ] government to complete remaining inspections as soon 
as possible to prevent recurrence of workplace tragedies such as those that occurred in 
2012 and 2013. There is more work to do . . . . We also urge the [Bangladesh] 
government to accelerate its efforts to ensure workers’ rights and to take measures to 
address continuing reports of harassment of and violence against labor activists who 
are attempting to exercise their rights.
93
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the-alliance (last visited Sept. 30, 2015). 
 88.  See generally Mohammad Yunus & Tatsufumi Yamagata, The Garment Industry in 
Bangladesh, in DYNAMICS OF THE GARMENT INDUSTRY IN LOW-INCOME COUNTRIES: EXPERIENCE 
OF ASIA AND AFRICA (INTERIM REPORT) 4 (Takahiro Fukunishi ed., 2012), 
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plaza-bangladesh-anniversary-a-look-back-and-forward. 
 90.  Amy Kazmin, Bangladesh Factory Collapse a Catalyst for Workers’ Rights, FIN. TIMES (May 3, 
2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8c72524e-b3e1-11e2-ace9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz412YkWw7B.  
 91.  Amy Kazmin et al., Bangladesh Factory Disasters Highlight Regulatory Failures, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 25, 2013), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9a551ce8-adab-11e2-82b8-00144feabdc0.html#slide0.  
 92.  See generally Gary Gereffi & Stacey Frederick, The Global Apparel Value Chain, Trade and 
the Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities for Developing Countries (The World Bank, Policy Research 
Working Paper no. 5281, 2010), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3769/ 
WPS5281.pdf?sequence=1. 
 93.  Do More to Regain GSP Facility, US Tells Bangladesh, BANGLADESH BUSINESS NEWS (Jan. 
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The United States is using trade leverage to put the onus on the Bangladeshi 
government to improve workplace safety and to protect the right of workers to 
organize. The European Union, together with the ILO, the United States, and 
Bangladesh, launched the Sustainability Compact for Bangladesh to improve 
conditions for workers in the garment industry.94 One year later, the European 
Commission was still calling on Bangladesh “to complete the labor law reform, 
training, and recruitment of inspectors and to create the conditions for 
meaningful freedom of association.”95 
Much as the speedy passing of the Accord and the signing of the Alliance 
owed to enormous public pressure on multinationals connected to the garment-
producing facilities in Bangladesh, growing public concern with multinationals’ 
behavior in foreign countries has long focused on a wide range of actual and 
potential rights violations vis-à-vis workers, indigenous communities, 
established traditional practices, and forms of knowledge including 
understandings of land use and entitlements or the environment. Although a 
global public may today learn of an egregious rights violation committed by a 
multinational company, subsidiary, or contracting partners, a closer look at such 
events often reveals a much more complex picture. The legal “case” or “event” 
is but an indicator of complicated socioeconomic, cultural, and historical 
constellations of interests and stakes, the understanding of which will frequently 
require intensive, sometimes years-long, on-the-ground, ethnographic 
research.96 A lawyer who is called upon to work on such a case experiences a 
significant gap and tension between “legal” interest representation and 
engagement with the underlying substantive problem. Lawyers, called upon as 
problem solvers, find themselves couched and constrained in the dynamics of 
their clients’ interest representation within a legal, justiciable framework. To 
solve, or even to address the problem adequately, the lawyer has to go far 
beyond the legal litigation itself. A contextual reading of the facts of Rana Plaza 
focuses on this gap between the justiciable case and the bigger underlying 
problem. It reveals the societal dimension of a case, what human rights lawyers 
call the “root causes” of a rights violation.97 
This root cause does not exhaust itself in a conflict between two opposing 
rights. Rather, it points to the inherent limits of an approach that aims at 
capturing a social problem through the lens of rights. Lawyers find themselves 
 
 94.  EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht Launches Global Sustainability Compact in Response to 
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 96.  George E. Marcus, The Contemporary Desire for Ethnography and Its Implication for 
Anthropology, in TRANSFORMING ETHNOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE 73 (Rebecca Hardin & Kamari 
Maxine Clarke eds., 2012). 
 97.  See, e.g., Susan Marks, Human Rights and Root Causes, 74 MOD. L. REV. 57 (2011); see also 
Human Rights Council, The Role of Prevention in the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
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confronted with the problem of having to translate social facts into the language 
of law, which appears to be the only legitimate and effective way to make or 
build a particular case.98 In the concrete case of Rana Plaza, such a contextual 
approach can reveal the actual place of this incident in both local and 
transnational spaces of the globalized, ready-made garment industry. It can help 
one appreciate the regulatory environment for an industry that places second 
globally (after China).99 Precisely because of the hybrid, transnational nature of 
the regulatory regime for this part of the global supply chain, most existing 
categories fall short of capturing the different dynamics between local and other 
actors. What significance, for example, should the compensation fund for 
eventual future disasters in the industry have, which G7 leaders announced on 
June 8th during their Schloss Elmau meeting?100 What impact will the recently 
filed murder charges before a Bangladeshi court for the wrongful death of 1,137 
Rana Plaza workers have for safer regulation of the supply chain?101 It is only by 
going beyond these attention-capturing developments that one can further 
unfold102 the complexity of globe-spanning production and distribution regimes 
such as that of the garment supply chain. 
VI 
EMPOWERMENT DREAMS AND THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF CORPORATE SELF-
REGULATION 
The above is a sketch of (what should be a more detailed account of) how a 
socio-legal and political critique of subsidiarity invocations in international and 
transnational law has very different normative stakes for different 
constituencies. From a private law perspective, it becomes more evident how 
invocations of subsidiarity, empowerment, and self-government are likely to 
result in increasing the precarious state of already vulnerable stakeholders, and 
in continuing to immunize powerful private actors from public accountability. 
Given the dramatic global governance gap,103 the rise of so-called transnational 
private regulatory governance remains of particular political concern. The 
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chances of developing a coherent political, even constitutional, critique of 
private governance as being possible within the nation-state are considerably 
dim. The brief analysis of the regulatory aftermath of the Rana Plaza tragedy 
illustrates the concrete challenges facing the attempts of conceptualizing and 
implementing a labor law regime that adequately addresses locally embedded 
yet globally structured supply chains. What a private law analysis reveals 
fundamentally challenges current assertions within public international law 
regarding the possible merits of relying on subsidiarity to close global 
governance gaps. A private law analysis illustrates some of the risks in 
endorsing bottom-up governance ideas as an available remedy to address 
shortcomings on the international scale. Above all, a private law perspective on 
Rana Plaza offers a more differentiated analysis of how the regime operates in 
action. One reason for private law’s explanatory potential lies in the fact that 
private law modulates and translates existing as well as evolving business 
patterns, processes, and institutions into legal form.104 Another reason is that 
regulatory logic tends to follow specific organizational and management 
rationalities that govern complex business regimes. Global supply chains and 
the garment industry are cases in point. The widespread legal insulation 
mechanisms between the actual producers in the Global South and the buyers 
in the North are the legal mirror image of business structures that are based on 
a system of indirect sourcing, referred to as “subcontracting without 
transparency or oversight.”105  The echo of famous (indeed, infamous) landmark 
rulings regarding the “legal person”106 can be heard loud and clear, underscoring 
law’s (and lawyers’) ability to adapt its concepts and instruments to social 
formations and practices considered meritorious. The far-progressed erosion of 
public authority even on the local level makes the downstreaming of public 
responsibility to lower governance levels a direct liability. Private interests will 
readily assume the role of self-regulation as long as it can be ensured that they 
remain untarnished from effective public-law enforcement mechanisms. That is 
one of the central insights from Rana Plaza—it prompts further reflection on 
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the consequences of giving up perhaps too quickly on the role of the state in 
governing global production networks. 
Something seems to still be missing. This article’s legal realist 
deconstruction of subsidiarity as a form of neoliberalism’s bottom-up 
governance dreams in disguise, applied to a terrible disaster that occurred in a 
far-away place, rendered familiar by labeling it a labor and human rights 
tragedy in the context of a global supply chain, seems too neat to be true. And 
yet, what is wrong with the analysis? It offers a number of seemingly pertinent 
insights into the rhetoric of justifying market-driven, hybrid regulatory regimes 
in the absence of effective state or global government and rule enforcement. 
Furthermore, it makes a seemingly convincing argument for thinking about law 
beyond jurisdictional confines against the background of functionally 
differentiated spaces of institutional and normative development. Finally, the 
here-presented preliminary findings further support attempts to differentiate 
the idea and the principle of subsidiarity in international law. As Jachtenfuchs 
and Krisch illustrate in their introduction,107 there is great potential to study the 
subsidiarity principle in concrete governance settings. When doing so, 
differentiating between bounded and unbounded, weak and strong forms of 
subsidiarity enables paying closer attention to concrete circumstances in which 
governance mechanisms can be seen not only to work upward or downward, but 
in which concrete manner these dynamics are being accompanied or 
complemented by institutions and processes of control or monitoring. Those 
differentiations go some distance in clarifying the actual operation of 
subsidiarity in various global governance contexts. They also echo the here-
cited findings that seemed to espouse a private law perspective in 
recommending a closer scrutiny of power dynamics at play in what are 
frequently highly asymmetric and politically volatile arrangements.108 There 
seems to be little room for an all-or-nothing endorsement of the subsidiarity 
principle as a call-to-arms for bottom-up forms of governance and 
empowerment. But though the rhetoric of bottom-up or market-driven 
governance seems as strong as ever,109 there is an even greater need for a 
differentiated engagement with the actual forms of shifting governance regimes. 
The private law perspective can complement an international lawyer’s grasp of 
the problem by highlighting not only the parallels and echoes between 
organizational and management business practices and legal structures and 
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instruments. It can also illustrate the transnational “replay” that occurs 
rhetorically and in terms of institutional strategy between the domestic and 
transnational spheres.110 Using transnational law as a method to investigate the 
stakes in attributing certain legal categories and characteristics to particular 
spheres, levels, or domains of law prompts us to accept the fluidity of the 
domestic–transnational law distinction. As suggested elsewhere,111 transnational 
law should be seen less as a distinct legal field than as a form of law critically 
engaging with demarcations between allegedly distinct fields of law. Law’s 
allocation to public or private, national or international conceptual buckets still 
holds some explanatory function with a view to historically evolved and locally 
instantiated patterns of legal ordering. But the risk of such containment and 
allocation lies in missing the unique role that law plays in both structuring and 
deconstructing norm-creation processes in areas that do not neatly fit into the 
public–private, national–international mold. The tentatively emerging 
regulatory regime of global apparel supply chains serves as one complex 
illustration of this phenomenon. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
This article has, ironically, both questioned and reaffirmed distinctions 
between public and private law, even as it attempts to introduce a transnational 
law perspective in order to critically engage and overcome these distinctions as 
separating realities. The engagement with subsidiarity, then, seems to have 
functioned as a red herring, prompting debate about practical merits as well as 
normative implications of top-down versus bottom-up, public versus private, 
and national and domestic versus international and global. This harkens to the 
fallacy of the familiar. Actors tend to carry out conflicts in well-established 
patterns, relying on well-rehearsed rhetorical turns and defending the same 
positions. Much of that has to do with the close circle of discussants one chooses 
to engage and with limited understanding of alternative viewpoints. The 
juxtaposition between a public international lawyer’s view on subsidiarity and 
the corresponding view of a private lawyer helps elucidate the recurring 
argumentative patterns that unfold almost indistinguishably in the domestic and 
the global sphere. But leaving this familiar zone, one is quickly confronted with 
how parochial and exclusive one’s take on the issue most likely has been. From 
a Global South perspective, for example, the evocation of subsidiarity is likely 
to raise an entirely different set of references, leading to a different 
identification of the relevant stakes and to an alternative vision of what matters. 
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Assuming, cognizant of the risk of overgeneralization, such a perspective, it 
soon becomes clear how even a slight shift of one’s own vantage point is likely 
to produce a dramatically different range of measures, engagements, and 
consequences.112 An outsider’s merely cursory view from such an alternative 
position suggests that there is a great need to second-guess, to “provincialize”113 
one’s taken-for-granted perspective and reference frameworks. That seems to 
be the next true frontier for thinking about subsidiarity. 
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